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Philip Corboy personifies the elite of the plaintiffs’ personal injury bar in 
Chicago. He is an Irish Catholic Democrat from a working-class family; he 
attended a local law school; and he gradually built both his own career and a 
prosperous firm that is consistently one of the leaders in personal injury prac- 
tice in Chicago. He is renowned as a courtroom advocate, and he speaks out 
more generally on the need for lawyers to take on large corporations on behalf 
of ordinary people victimized by corporate wrongdoing. He provides the model 
and often the personal connection and mentorship for successful personal in- 
jury lawyers who have followed him. 
Corboy’s story is also emblematic for other reasons. After his service during 
World War I1 and with funds made available from the GI Bill, he graduated at 
the top of his law school class. Despite this academic achievement, he lacked 
access to the careers found at the prestigious corporate law firms. Instead, he 
followed another path, taking advantage of opportunities that were available to 
individuals with his background and credentials. This article examines how 
Corboy established himself at the center of what was then emerging as a rec- 
ognized personal injury bar. Yet this is not just a story about Philip Corboy. The 
trajectory of Corboy’s career parallels the advancement of the personal injury 
bar, and Corboy himself helped to build and shape this subprofession. We 
therefore draw upon Corboy’s background and career to illuminate the devel- 
opment of the plaintiffs’ bar in the second half of the 20th century. 
Philip Corboy, who is now 80 years old, has been at the top of the 
personal injury bar in Chicago for most of the period after World War 11. He 
was among the first personal injury lawyers in the nation to secure a $1 million 
jury verdict (1974). He has secured over 250 settlements or jury awards of 
$1 million or more, including a $25 million settlement on behalf of a woman 
whose husband was killed in the 1989 United Airlines crash in Sioux City, 
Iowa. He has gained professional distinction as president of the Chicago Bar 
Association ( 1972-73) and the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association ( 1963-64), 
and as chair of the American Bar Association Section of Litigation (1979-80). 
He has the recognition of his peers, who know him as the “dean” of the personal 
injury bar in Chicago. Corboy’s enduring prominence in Chicago is also evi- 
dent in studies of the Chicago bar. In the 1975 and 1995 American Bar Foun- 
dation studies of the Chicago bar, Corboy was the most connected of all local 
“notables” (Heinz and Laumann 1982; Heinz, Nelson, et al. forthcoming). He 
also has long-standing connections to the Democratic Party in Chicago and 
elsewhere, and a long list of philanthropic activities. Corboy even has a street 
named after him, Philip H. Corboy Way, which appropriately runs for one 
block in front of the Cook County Circuit Court headquarters (Richard J. 
Daley Center) in downtown Chicago. 
More generally, Corboy personifies the characteristics of elite personal 
injury lawyers in Chicago today. The elite tend to be Catholic or Jewish males 
who come from modest backgrounds and attend local law schools. They are at 
the top of a referral chain that channels the biggest cases to them and their 
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firms, and they reinforce their position through their ability and willingness to 
bring high-risk cases to  juries. In their professional lives they demonstrate 
their commitment to the collective through professional leadership, political 
activism, local philanthropy, and mentoring young lawyers like themselves 
who follow in their footsteps.’ In this article we examine how these came to 
be the defining traits of elite plaintiffs’ lawyers in Chicago. 
At the same time, Corboy’s story provides a mean to explore the so- 
ciological development of this major “subprofession”-the plaintiffs’ bar. 
Their courtroom successes, professional and political activities, and local 
philanthropy all reinforce the stature of the elite within the plaintiffs’ bar. 
This has translated into a substantial upgrading in the general social status of 
this segment of the personal injury bar. The personal injury bar now produces 
many bar leaders, and legal scholars have in recent years produced a much more 
favorable view than was found a generation ago (Daniels and Martin 1999, 
2000; Kritzer 1997, forthcoming; Kritzer and Krishnan 1999; Parikh 2001). 
Yet one of the challenges of a study of a relatively well-established 
subprofession is that its characteristics now seem natural and inevitable. 
Corboy’s career provides a means to explain why this subprofession has par- 
ticular characteristics, why they tend to endure, and how they serve a pro- 
fessional hierarchy that places Corboy and others like him at the top. We 
cannot provide an account of possible alternative histories, since the losers 
have left few traces, but we can put the current situation in perspective by 
seeing how a subprofession emerged that defines itself as the culmination of a 
struggle for justice on behalf of ordinary people against powerful corporations 
(Jacobson and White 2004). The emergence of this subprofession was not 
inevitable, nor was it inevitable that this particular group of lawyers, and not 
others from the legal profession or elsewhere, came to  define an area of prac- 
tice focused on one side of personal injuries. A sociological account also 
shows what holds this subprofession together and what might threaten its 
survival in the future-beyond the obvious candidates like tort reform. 
I. OUR APPROACH 
This article is based on archival data, lengthy interviews that we have 
undertaken with Corboy and other personal injury lawyers in Chicago, and 
1. The high-end and elite lawyers epitomized by Corboy represent only a small minority 
of Chicago plaintiffs’ lawyers. As others have found, the personal injury bar is a highly stratified 
subprofession (Carlin 1962; Daniels and Martin 1999; Kritzer 2001; Van Hoy 1999). The 
majority of Chicago plaintiffs’ lawyers handle a high volume of smaller cases-mostly auto- 
mohile accidents and other minor injury cases valued in the $10,000-$30,000 range (Parikh 
2001 ). These “low-end” practitioners are also predominantly Catholic or Jewish males from 
working-class backgrounds and local law schools. These low-end lawyers are less active in the 
profession, yet they are integrated into a community of personal injury lawyers that is defined 
and defended by its most elite practitioners. 
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on 62 in-depth interviews with Chicago plaintiffs’ lawyers that Parikh con- 
ducted for her study of social networks in the plaintiffs’ personal injury bar.2 
Our examination of the development and maturation of this sub- 
profession is consistent with a well-developed body of sociological research in 
the law-and-society tradition. Richard Abel’s work on the legal profession in 
the United States and England, in particular, focuses on the way lawyers seek 
to gain status for their profession at the same time that they seek to build and 
protect the markets for their services (e.g., Abel 1989,2003; Abel and Lewis 
1995). Drawing on Larson’s (1977) concept of the twin aims (market and 
status) of the “professionalism project,” Abel emphasizes lawyers’ efforts to 
limit entry into the profession, enhance professional credentials, expand 
markets, and control competition from inside and outside the profession. 
Abel’s theoretical approach also encompasses lawyers’ efforts to maintain and 
enforce professional values such as pro bono and public service. Abel con- 
sistently shows the necessity to situate legal professionalism-including legal 
aid, educational reforms, and even legal ethics-in relation to the essentials 
of building a market and a professional status that can reap market rewards. 
The markets and status model of professionalism provides the basic 
orientation, but in our opinion it shares some of the limitations of the 
rational-actor model of neoclassical economics. In the neoclassical model, 
actors in a market strategically select from a range of options as they seek to 
maximize profit through one-shot transactions with anonymous exchange 
partners. Little, if any, weight is placed on the environment within which 
these actors operate. Economic sociologists, in contrast, view markets as so- 
cially structured and embedded in a larger sociopolitical context that shapes 
actors’ choices. Just as the behavior of markets and market actors cannot be 
explained solely from the perspective of economic rationality, the behavior of 
professional markets and professionals cannot be explained solely through 
what could be termed “professional rationality.” 
The sociological quest to move beyond economic rationality has gained 
considerable momentum in the past two decades. Much of the literature goes 
2. In addition to interviews we conducted jointly with Corboy and other Chicago per- 
sonal injury lawyers, this article draws heavily upon research conducted by Sara Parikh for her 
doctoral dissertation (2001). Parikh’s research uses social network analysis to examine the 
hierarchy in the profession, the cohesion of its members, the structure of the market for 
personal injury cases, and the juxtaposition of market competition and professional cohesion. 
Parikh‘s dissertation was based on 62 in-depth interviews conducted between 1998 and 2000 
with a stratified sample of low-end, high-end, and elite members of the Chicago plaintiffs’ 
personal injury bar. The majority of the interviews were conducted with attorneys identified 
from a random sample of case filings in the Cook County Circuit Court. In addition, interviews 
were conducted with 11 “elite” members of the Chicago plaintiffs’ personal injury bar. Bor- 
rowing the method adopted in the studies of the Chicago bar by Heinz et al. (Heinz and 
Laumann 1982; Heinz, Nelson, et al. forthcoming), the elite were identified before interview- 
ing began through discussions with “informants” inside and outside of the personal injury bar. 
Overall, Parikh contacted 82 personal injury attorneys for her research and 62 (78 percent) 
agreed to participate. Eleven out of 12 elites agreed to participate. 
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under the heading of “economic sociology” (Swedberg 2003; Fligstein 2001 ), 
but it is also found in the “new institutionalism,’’ which is concerned with the 
socially constructed behavior of organizations and institutions and the need 
for the legitimation of particular models and approaches (see, e.g., Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991). The same approach is also evident in Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of “habitus,” developed in order to break with “the theory of homo- 
economicus as rational agent” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992,120-21). All 
these scholars use the conceptual tool of the “field” as a means to uncover “all 
those practices that are reasonable without being the product of a reasoned 
purpose and, even less, of conscious computation” (120). Fligstein (2001), for 
example, calls for a “political-cultural’’ approach to the sociology of markets, 
highlighting the importance of examining market construction within a par- 
ticular field. 
The field-analogous to a playing field-is a basic tool for this kind of 
research. Intentionally left without precise boundaries, the field is defined as a 
semiautonomous social space with a specific hierarchy and power structure 
and a particular set of resources. In examining an emerging market, organi- 
zation, or profession, scholars with this perspective tend to take a special 
interest in the sociopolitical context and in the relationships (i.e., social 
networks) among actors in the field. The power of actors in a field typi- 
cally depends on links to outside sources of power. The sociopolitical con- 
text and social networks reveal the historical constraints and opportunities 
that led to  the development and legitimation of a particular field. Our anal- 
ysis, then, seeks to explain that what now seems natural and normal-and 
even economically and professionally rational-conceals hierarchies, con- 
nections to power, and other possibilities not apparent in traditional pro- 
fessional histories that focus mainly on the strategies used to build markets 
and status. 
Our approach in this article can be characterized as “relational biogra- 
phy” (Dezalay and Garth 2002, 9). Relational biography relies on career 
histories to reveal the particular sociopolitical context that shapes actors’ 
choices, the social networks that key actors are able to draw upon, and the 
strategies that they use as they attempt to make their way in the professional 
and social world in which they find themselves. By “strategy,” therefore, we 
do not necessarily mean self-conscious efforts with rational ends such as to 
build markets and prestige, but rather “reasonable” choices made in the 
context of specific opportunities and constraints. 
More precisely, our goal is to explain the development of the personal 
injury bar by examining the world that Corboy and his peers inhabited and 
how they perceived and acted upon the constraints and opportunities in that 
world. In Bourdieu’s terms, we wish to examine how Corboy operated given 
the “capital” he could mobilize, including the social networks and personal 
characteristics that might seem unrelated to the specific tasks of building a 
successful law practice. 
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We use a narrative approach to show how the choices Corboy and his 
peers made were shaped by their environment. In telling this story, we 
highlight a few features especially relevant to our theoretical framework, but 
the theoretical implications are largely saved until the end? 
Corboy entered the legal profession shortly after World War I1 and 
remains a leader in the Chicago plaintiffs’ bar today. Therefore, this article 
covers the construction of the profession between World War I1 and the 
present. We understand that we could have started our story earlier. There 
were, after all, important developments and actors in the plaintiffs’ bar prior 
to  World War I1 that, no doubt, set the stage for what f ~ l l o w e d . ~  Our more 
limited claim is that the organized plaintiffs’ bar, as we know it today, “came 
of age” (Daniels and Martin 2003) in the second half of the 20th century. 
Indeed, a recent book celebrating the history of the Association of Trial 
Lawyers of America shows how the association grew from a small group of 
workers’ compensation lawyers in the late 1940s to the nation’s largest spe- 
cialty bar association by the end of the 20th century (Jacobson and White 
2004). During the period covered by Corboy’s career, the plaintiffs’ bar 
grew from a small number of relatively marginal practitioners to a much 
larger, more prosperous, and more respectable group, and it is the nature of 
that transformation-the coming of age of a subprofession-that we wish to 
explore. 5 
3. For a similar approach examining the law and society tradition, see Garth and Sterling 
1998. 
4. There is conflicting opinion among American sociolegal scholars as to when and to 
what extent laws and juries became more favorable for plaintiffs. Friedman (2002) and Speiser 
(1980), for example, argue that the plaintiff-friendly climate is a product of 20th-century 
America. Prior to this, the fellow-servant rule prohibited a worker from suing his employer over 
the negligence of another employee. Under the privity doctrine, a consumer injured by a 
product could sue only the party that sold i t  to him (and not its manufacturer or producer). The 
“doctrine of charitable immunity” prohibited lawsuits against hospitals, churches, schools, or 
other charitable organizations. And under the “doctrine of contributory negligence” a plaintiff 
could not recover from a defendant if the plaintiff contributed (to any degree) to the accident 
himself. Accordingly, the chances for recovery were relatively slim, and even when plaintiffs 
prevailed, awards were nominal (Friedman 2002; Speiser 1980). However, Bergstrom (1992) 
investigated trends in civil cases in New York from 1870 to 1910, and found a “tort explosion” 
of personal injury suits at the turn of the century, despite the fact that negligence rules had not 
changed during the period. Bergstrom notes that while the number of personal injury suits rose, 
both plaintiff win rates and damages actually declined in New York between 1870 and 1910. 
Karsten (1997, 1998), however, argues that the contingency fee had become an accepted 
practice in America by the mid-19th century and that injured plaintiffs fared well over the last 
half of the 19th century as American judges and juries held railroads and other corporate 
defendants to increasingly higher standards. Karsten ( 1997) concludes that when controlling 
for relative wages, personal injury awards in the late-19th century were even more generous 
than they were in the late-20th century. Resolving this debate is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
5 .  Though we focus on Philip Corboy, there were a number of other elite members of the 
Illinois plaintiffs’ bar who made significant contributions to the advancement of the profession 
and the liberalization of tort law during this period. Many, but not all, are mentioned in the 
telling of Corboy’s story. 
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11. THE WORKING-CLASS ORIGINS AND SOCIAL 
NETWORKS OF THE PLAINTIFFS’ BAR 
In the period after World War 11, the legal profession appeared to a young 
lawyer like Corboy to be dominated by and for the corporate bar, which 
recruited almost exclusively from a WASP establishment legitimated with de- 
grees from Ivy League schools (for confirming evidence see Heinz and Laumann 
1982; Heinz, Nelson, et al. forthcoming). Corporate lawyers controlled the bar 
associations and played civic roles that reinforced their professional status. 
Catholics or Jews or the graduates of local law schools, doubly penalized for 
their working-class or immigrant backgrounds, had limited access to the cor- 
porate elite.6 Lacking this access, they typically followed a different track. 
Born in 1924, Corboy was the eldest of three children. His parents, both 
children of Irish immigrants, attended Chicago Catholic schools and at- 
tained a high school education at most. His father and later his brother were 
Chicago police officers. His childhood was marked by adversity. His family 
defaulted and lost its home on Chicago’s north side when Corboy was 14 years 
old. Despite those financial difficulties, Corboy attended Catholic grammar 
schools and a Catholic high school. With steady encouragement from an 
uncle who was a local priest, Corboy set his sights on college. He attended a 
series of different undergraduate institutions, but he never did graduate. 
After serving in the army during World War 11, Corboy took advantage 
of the opportunities under the GI Bill. He was able to enter Loyola University 
Law School, a local Jesuit law institution, because it waived the undergraduate 
degree requirement for students who had amassed enough college credit. Given 
the opportunity, he thrived. He graduated from Loyola as valedictorian in 1948. 
Graduation at the top of his class, however, did not mean an abundance 
of professional opportunities. Corboy recalls the limited access to the cor- 
porate bar at the time: 
They did not come on campus. They did not interview. I don’t know 
how you got [a job with them], because I didn’t get one. I think they 
acquired them from prestige law schools, mostly from the East. One, 
two schools in the Midwest, maybe Michigan and Chicago. North- 
western was still a regional school then..  . . I think they chose people 
who were from large law schools-I mean prestige law schools who 
were on the law review and all that. The same way they do today. 
Corboy had one interview with a law firm, which at the time was a 
defense firm that represented the gas company. As he told it, 
6.  As Purcell observes, “Frequently a product of the allegedly inferior night law schools that 
began to spread in the 1890s, the new urban personal injury attorney was often Catholic or Jewish 
and a product of the new immigration from southern and eastern Europe.. . . [Tlhe partisan gulf 
that opened between the established bar and the personal injury bar grew as much from ethnic and 
social differences, real and perceived, as from their professional ones” (1992, 150). 
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The Law School Dean sent me over there. [Despite my marks,] I did 
not get the job. The lawyer in my class who got the job was a fellow 
who did not-I won’t tell you his name, it would not be fair to him, did 
not have the marks that the three of us who were sent over there had. 
He was in the middle of his class. . . somewhere. But he got the job. We 
found out later that his uncle was an executive of the gas company. 
Corboy, however, was not without his own resources. As he stated, 
I had an uncle, too. My uncle, at one time, he was a priest at St. John 
Bercham. . . . [H]e sent me two places, my uncle did. He knew a lot of 
people. He sent me to the United States Attorney’s Office, where I was 
interviewed and told to come back. Their telling me to come back, I was 
told later, guaranteed me a job as an Assistant United States Attorney. 
Corboy figured that a Truman defeat would lead to losing his position in 
the U.S. Attorney’s office, so he did not pursue it. To continue in his words, 
So anyhow. . . my uncle had gotten me a job in the [City of Chicago] 
Corporation Counsel’s office. Again, he got me an interview. And that 
was all I needed, because I had very good marks. And I went to the Cor- 
poration Counsel’s office.. . . And my job was librarian.. . . Got the 
library in shape. And at the same time, I took the bar exam. 
At that time there were about 100 lawyers in the office of the Corpo- 
ration Counsel. According to Corboy, about half of those people “stayed 
there for the rest of their lives,” while the other “half.. . became judges.” 
Careers were built on a “seniority basis, plus political affiliation.” Encouraged 
by his boss, Corboy became a precinct captain in the 49th ward in Chicago. 
He also ran for president of the Young Democrats of Cook County, losing in 
his first effort but succeeding the following year. 
As suggested in Corboy’s story, the careers then open to an Irish Catholic 
Loyola law graduate from the top of the class were those built through local 
Democratic politics and political contacts. In their book about Mayor Richard 
J. Daley and the Democratic machine, Anzerican Pharaoh, Cohen and Taylor 
note that “if the Irish did not run Chicago-most of the businesses, banks, and 
newspapers were in Protestant hands-they did dominate the Democratic 
machine out of all proportions to their numbers” (2000,37). &hen and Taylor 
and others have speculated that the Irish Catholic origins of the machine gave 
it a particular structure and flavor. Advancement required knowing one’s place 
in the hierarchy, staying within an established role, maintaining strong social 
relations, and offering unconditional loyalty to the party. 
Legal careers within the political machine provided an alternative track 
to the one available to the corporate bar. The predominantly Irish Catholic 
political system in Chicago produced politicians, U.S. attorneys, municipal 
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corporation counsel, state’s attorneys, and public defenders, and there were 
places in the judiciary to reward those who provided service in the other 
positions. The products of the system, as Corboy himself noted, were “shaped” 
and “matured” by the “pristine political system.” He added, “When I started 
the practice of law, all judges came through the political system.” The judi- 
ciary’s background meant that they “understood people. That understanding 
of people made them very, very good judges.” The Chicago plaintiffs’ bar has 
its roots in this local political en~ i ronmen t .~  
The close ties to local politics gave individuals such as Corboy access to a 
different set of resources and powerful actors from those of the corporate bar. 
This heritage did more than open doors for Corboy and others; it signaled 
similar life experiences and a shared worldview. Further, as we will see, many of 
the qualities of the Democratic machine (e.g., hierarchy, loyalty, strong social 
relations) are reproduced in the Chicago plaintiffs’ bar.* Finally, as we shall also 
see, the close connection to Democratic politics has been crucial to the survival 
of the plaintiffs’ bar when faced with business threats in the name of tort reform. 
111. THE EARLY PROFESSIONAL STRATEGY: 
FOCUS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPECTABILITY 
AND INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
Returning to Corboy’s personal story, we can easily imagine a career in 
politics or the judiciary for this sharp young lawyer with good connections in 
Chicago Democratic politics. Corboy’s uncle guided him into the office of the 
~~~ 
7. The Chicago Lawyers studies confirm the proximity of Chicago plaintiffs’ lawyers to the 
local bar leadership and the local Democratic political structure. In both 1975 and 1995, the 
Chicago Lawyers researchers asked respondents about their ties to a predetermined group of 
local elite lawyers or “notables.” In both studies, the authors identified three broad clusters of 
notables, tied through their common connections. One cluster contained corporate notables; 
the second a group of liberal notables; and the third a set of trial lawyers that overlapped with 
bar leaders and political figures (Heinz and Laumann 1982; Heinz, Laumann, et al. 1997). 
Commenting on this finding in the 1975 data, Heinz and Laumann concluded: “The trial 
lawyers/CBA [Chicago Bar Association] sphere has clear political ties to the Regular Dem- 
ocrats. It  is probable that one of the principal sources of the influence of this sphere is its abil- 
ity to mobilize the resources of the city and county governments, to secure the benefits that it 
is within the power of City Hall to confer” (1982, 314). 
8. There are indications that the purity of this system has been diluted in recent years. 
Corboy himself lamented the weakening of this system and Heinz et al. speculate that this 
may be attributable to the “decline in the fortunes of the Regular Democratic organization in 
Chicago and to the Republicans’ control of the governor’s office” that occurred after the death 
of Mayor Richard J. Daley in 1976 (Heinz, Nelson, et al. forthcoming). Nevertheless, there 
are still remnants today. Of the 53 Cook County Law Division judges who preside over per- 
sonal injury and other civil disputes, two-thirds (68 percent-versus about 45 percent of the 
total bar in Chicago) attended a local Chicago law school (DePaul, Loyola, Kent, and John 
Marshall). These are the same four law schools that feed into the Chicago plaintiffs’ bar 
(Parikh 2001 ). Further, most of today’s Chicago plaintiffs’ lawyers either began their career in 
personal injury (plaintiff or defense) or moved to the plaintiffs’ bar from the state’s attorney or 
public defenders office. 
278 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 
Corporation Counsel and ensured that he would be given a good assignment 
there. As it turned out, however, Corboy’s career took a notable detour less 
than two years after he began work at the Corporation Counsel’s office. Ac- 
cording to Corboy, “I was happy, I was content, I was secure, I was earning, I 
was doing things that lawyers many years my senior would never do. I was on 
a professional roll. Then out of the blue James Dooley entered my life.” 
James Dooley was another Irish Catholic graduate of Loyola, who un- 
beknownst to Corboy had even been a neighbor of his. Dooley was building a 
reputation in the emerging field of personal injury. At the time, according to 
Corboy, there were “two types of lawyers that handled personal injury cases. 
Those who acquire business and are either called litigation lawyers or they’re 
just called personal injury lawyers; they don’t try cases.” Then there were 
those like Dooley, who “tried cases.” Corboy had noticed that “Mr. Dooley, 
while I was in law school, he acquired the largest verdict up to that time. I t  
was $I85,000.” 
Corboy had been marshal of the Phi Alpha Delta Law Fraternity, a po- 
sition that Dooley had also held at Loyola. Corboy met Dooley when he invited 
Dooley to speak to the fraternity while Corboy was at Loyola. Dooley remem- 
bered the impression that Corboy made on him, and he later sought Corboy out 
to join Dooley’s small personal injury practice. According to Corboy, Dooley 
and “probably five or six other lawyers” in Illinois represented a new breed of 
personal injury lawyer who excelled in jury trials. Dooley was the most prom- 
inent, and Corboy saw an opportunity to move into a practice that had begun to 
attract some attention at Loyola and more generally in the legal profession. 
Dooley’s offer moved Corboy off the traditional local political track. 
Dooley did not recruit from the corporate bar or the elite schools. Those 
with elite credentials still thought of personal injury lawyers as ambulance 
chasers with poor standards of professional ethics. Personal injury lawyers did 
not occupy prominent positions in professional organizations or have a rep- 
utation for trial craft. Dooley, Corboy could see, was working to distance 
himself and others like him who “tried cases” from the ambulance chasers and 
case processors. They had to gain legitimacy within a professional context 
that favored the corporate bar. Even the ethical rules were constructed to 
reinforce the status of corporate lawyers (Purcell 1992). As Carlin (1966) 
noted, handing out business cards at the country club was permitted, while 
handing out business cards in emergency rooms was not. Dooley was actively 
organizing to try to upgrade the reputation of a kind of practice-representing 
accident victims-long tarred by the professional elite. 
Around this very time, in fact, many of the specialty associations de- 
voted to plaintiffs’ personal injury lawyers were first established. The prede- 
cessor to the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) was founded 
in 1946 as the National Association of American Claimants’ Attorneys 
(NAACA). Its early focus was on compensation for workers’ injuries, but the 
famous tort lawyer Melvin Belli joined and contributed to its transformation 
Philip Corboy and the Construction of the Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Bar 279 
into an organization for the plaintiffs’ personal injury bar (Jacobson and 
White 2004, 74-75). The Illinois Trial Lawyers Association (ITLA) was 
founded in 1952.9 These organizations were devoted to raising the standards 
of the profession, to improving the reputation of the plaintiffs’ bar, and to 
sharing information among members. Though not overtly political at their 
inception, both ITLA and ATLA had an early legislative agenda that sought 
to expand the legal rights of injured plaintiffs. One of the recurring debates in 
ATLA until the 1980s was between those who wanted to put more emphasis 
on political activity versus those whose focus was more on education and 
professional reputation (Jacobson and White 2004, 201).” 
Dooley was an early national leader of the plaintiffs’ bar. Dooley was the 
first president of ITLA, serving from 1952 to 1955, and he was one of the 
founders of NAACA. He was President of ATLA from 1953 to 1954, and 
president of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers in 1960. Through 
Dooley, Corboy saw the importance of investing in this collective self- 
improvement effort. 
According to a leading personal injury lawyer quite familiar with the 
careers of Corboy and Dooley, ‘There was one first generation and that was Jim 
Dooley. He was the most important progenitor of making personal injury 
practice respectable in Illinois. Prior to Jim Dooley, personal injury lawyers, I 
don’t have to tell you, on the scale of hierarchy were, if not at the bottom, 
certainly close to the bottom. And Jim Dooley did more than anyone to change 
that. And Corboy trained under Jim Dooley.”They sought to make the world of 
personal injury law respectable within the legal professional hierarchy. 
The second part of the Dooley strategy was to gain respect for their craft 
as attorneys who tried cases. While a law practice focused on advice and 
negotiation had the highest prestige in the corporate bar at the time, the quest 
for professional respectability among personal injury lawyers militated in 
favor of investment in pure law-litigation-that would separate these law- 
yers from the taint of ambulance chasing and case processing. In 1959, Dooley 
secured the first million-dollar-plus jury verdict in Cook County in a work 
injury case involving 18 plaintiffs. Dooley’s activities also included an ex- 
tensive appellate practice seeking to expand tort law on behalf of plain- 
tiffs. He reportedly appeared before the Illinois Appellate and Supreme 
Courts nearly 100 times during his career.” In addition, Dooley invested in 
9. Similar associations were established in other states around the same time. The Texas 
Trial Lawyers Association was founded in 1949, and the New York State Trial Lawyers Asso- 
ciation was founded in 1953. 
10. According to Jacobson and White, “Many viewed such special interest lobbying and 
political giving as distasteful and demeaning to the association. It was hugely expensive and 
threatened the educational programs that had brought ATLA growth and respect” (2004, 
201). It  appears that Dooley was on the side advising against aggressive political activity in 
the early days of ATLA (55). 
1 1. According to Corboy, Dooley’s “appellate advocacy was the genesis of many important 
opinions germane to the law of damages, negligence, due care and evidence” (Corboy 1979). 
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scholarship, authoring a three-volume treatise, Modern Tort Laeo (1977). 
Dooley in these ways built his reputation for trial and doctrinal expertise and 
not incidentally helped promote liberalization in tort law. He continued to 
practice as a leading plaintiffs’ lawyer until he was elected to the Illinois 
Supreme Court in 1976.12 His Supreme Court term was cut short by his 
sudden death in March 1978. 
Under Dooley’s tutelage, Corboy invested heavily in the practice of 
trying cases. He had his first jury trial within a month of starting with Dooley 
in 1950. He won that case, though the judge later took away the verdict. 
During his two years with Dooley’s firm, he conducted eight to ten jury trials, 
found his way around the Cook County Courthouse, and became acquainted 
with the repeat players on the plaintiff and defense sides. He watched when 
Dooley was on trial, and he met Dooley’s professional colleagues through the 
newly established ITLA and through ATLA. He watched Dooley speak to 
these and other professional associations. In all these activities, Corboy learned 
the importance both of trial craft and of the organizations that would celebrate 
it. Corboy also learned from Dooley how to prosper without the overt taint of 
ambulance chasing. Dooley followed a professional strategy to get business 
through referrals from other lawyers. With this experience under his belt, 
Corboy left Dooley’s firm in 1952 to start his own practice. At the time, it was 
standard practice for a young personal injury attorney to learn the trade under 
an established player, then leave to build his own practice. An elite plaintiffs’ 
lawyer explained: 
It used to be that personal injury lawyers were lone wolves. They never 
had partners. It was usually a big-name lawyer with three or four asso- 
ciates. When they either made enough money, or got too antsy and knew 
they weren’t going to be made partner, they’d go off on their own and 
start their own practice. Then [the mentor] would hire another associate 
and it would go on that way until he either died or retired. 
Though it was common for younger lawyers to leave their mentors, this 
apprenticeship model had a strong element of paternalism. Dooley and Corboy 
maintained their relationship until Dooley’s death. Dooley provided Corboy 
with early financial support, guidance, and advice on his cases, and encouraged 
his continued involvement in professional activities. When he went out on his 
own, Corboy borrowed $1,300 from Dooley and another $2,500 from a court 
reporter that he knew. Corboy eventually paid both of them back. Like Dooley, 
Corboy decided to specialize only in personal injury cases, though the value 
of those cases was much smaller than they would later become. Corboy also 
12. Lacking the backing of the Daley machine, which favored another candidate, Dooley 
won in part by advertising extensively on television with the help of Chicago Bears football 
star Dick Butkus, whom he had helped in an injury suit against the Bears. 
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deliberately set out to build a referral-based practice. Having seen how Dooley 
got business, when he went out on his own, he networked aggressively with 
other lawyers to generate business. Corboy recalls: 
When I first got out of Mr. Dooley’s office, I went to every lawyer who I 
met over in the courthouse and told them I was leaving and going out 
on my own. That is the first thing I did. I then took every opportunity 
there was to write or speak on the type of work that I thought I knew 
enough about. I did not go the route of going to Kiwanis, Better Busi- 
ness Bureau, Holy Name Society. . . . I didn’t go that route at all. I did 
the professional route. I went only to professionals, only lawyers. I let 
them know that if they did refer a case, they would get a portion of the 
fee.13 
These activities paid off for his business and helped set the pattern of 
securing clients by referrals rather than through the less-professional routes 
followed by some other personal injury lawyers. Carlin (1962) found evidence 
of this referral system in the early 1960s. More recent studies reveal the 
central role that the referral system continues to play in the personal injury 
bar (Daniels and Martin 1999; Kritzer forthcoming; Kritzer and Krishnan 
1999; Parikh 2001; Spurr 1988). The referral system ensures that the higher- 
value cases will, as a general rule, work their way up through the hierarchy of 
the plaintiffs’ bar, thereby reinforcing the stratification in the profession 
and the dominance of the prevailing elite. As Parikh found in her exami- 
nation of the lawyer referral system, personal injury lawyers work hard to 
develop and maintain these referral relationships, and having a referral-based 
business is a sign of prestige in the personal injury bar. Corboy reflected that “I 
think there is a feeling of accomplishment when another lawyer recognizes 
your specialty.. . . I like getting business from lawyers who think I’m com- 
petent.” Another high-end plaintiffs’ lawyer commented: 
I don’t mean to sound hoity-toity, because I know good attorneys who 
advertise. I think if you were to ask most plaintiffs’ PI attorneys who have 
a desire to have a respected reputation in Chicago, given their druthers 
. . . I think to a person, they’d say they’d rather not have to advertise. 
Having a good, strong referral base means that you don’t have to do the 
other things that most attorneys desiring respect would want to avoid: 
advertising, chasing, having to work really hard to get cases. 
When Corboy went out on his own, he got cases right away, 90 percent 
from other lawyers. He went from making $4,200 a year with Dooley to $25,000 
13. The referring attorney often gets a fee just for sending the case, often a third of the 
attorney fee, or a ninth of the total award. 
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a year on his own.l4 Corboy also became active in professional associations 
dedicated to trial lawyers (ITLA, ATLA). He served as president of ITLA from 
1963 to 1964. 
IV. LIBERALIZING TORT LAW IN THE SOCIAL 
ACTIVIST 1960s 
The 1960s were watershed years for the plaintiffs’ bar. They were able 
to improve their reputation with a combination of trial craft and profes- 
sional bar activity, and they improved their economic position through leg- 
islative lobbying and legal arguments made to judges like themselves. The 
timing was right. They were in tune with the spirit of the socially activist 
state and indeed relatively moderate as a group in relation to the civil rights 
struggles and antiwar e f f~ r t s . ’~  
The Illinois courts and legislature broadened the playing field of possible 
defendants in product liability, medical malpractice, and construction injury 
disputes.16 Changes in discovery rules also made it easier for plaintiffs’ attorneys 
to build their cases.” Elite plaintiff and defense lawyers helped to define the 
rules that governed their growing field.” Certainly there were differences in 
14. Corboy’s first “important case” came to him from a DePaul University Law School 
graduate who had been a member of the Phi Alpha Delta Fraternity at the same time as 
Corboy. The plaintiff was an army sergeant who was badly injured in an automobile accident. 
Corboy took the case to a jury in 1954, and the jury awarded the plaintiff $50,000, a very 
significant award at the time. 
15. “ATLA as an organization was ‘notoriously absent’ from active participation” in the 
civil rights movement (Jacobson and White 2004, 168). 
16. In 1965, ruling in Suvnda v. White Motor Corporation (32 111. 2d 612,210 N.E. 2d 182 
[1965]), the Illinois Supreme Court introduced the concept of strict liability, which made a 
defendant liable, per se, if his product was defective, regardless of negligence or privity. This 
opened the doors for product liability disputes against manufacturers. That same year, in 
Darfingv. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital (33 111.2d 326,211 N.E. 2d 253, 14 A.L.R. 
3d 860 [Ill. Sep 29, 1965]), the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that hospitals are responsible for 
the actions of their staff, which expanded the market for and potential value of medical 
malpractice disputes. Also in 1965, the Illinois Restatement (Second) of Torts clarified the 
Structural Work Act, indicating that a contractor can be held liable for the actions of inde- 
pendent contractors under his control. 
17. According to an elite personal injury lawyer commenting in retrospect on the 
changes, “Well, the climate changed.. . . [In the past] there were a lot of small cases, there was 
no discovery, depositions, and all the rest that we have. So, they basically got the file, did a 
little investigation, talked to their client, and went to trial. It was shoot from the hip, and 
then in the fifties and sixties, the discovery started, and when 1 started, almost nobody used 
expert witnesses. Expert witnesses were a rare breed; now you can’t have a falldown case 
without an expert witness.” 
18. Responding to perceived problems with jury instructions, for example, the Illinois 
Supreme Court created the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction Committee in 1957. The committee 
included both plaintiff and defense lawyers as well as members of the judiciary. Corboy was 
appointed to the committee on the recommendation of defense lawyers he had opposed in court. 
The committee’s charge was to develop a set of standardized jury instructions. The Illinois 
Patterned Instructions (IPI), adopted in 1961, rationalized the instructions and not incidentally 
clarified the types of damages that could be awarded for personal injury. The committee decided 
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perspective, but there was a shared sense that the law and practice of personal 
injury was developing in a positive fashion. The growing success in the court- 
room fed further success in the appellate courts. As Corboy noted, 
Before the Dooleys . . . and other people came along, there were not many 
cases going up to the appellate court, because there were not many cases 
where the plaintiff won the case. Defendants were . . . struck with larger 
verdicts starting in the ‘ ~ O S ,  and the ‘60s certainly. Then when a big 
verdict-an adequate verdict, not a big one, an adequate verdict, com- 
pensatory result came along at the trial level, they appealed them. And 
they acquired less and less success in the appellate court. The appellate 
and supreme courts responded to the needs of proper compensation. 
One of the legislative keys to success in advancing the tort field in 
Illinois was the removal of the $30,000 cap in wrongful death cases. Accord- 
ing to Corboy, ‘‘I was very active from the very beginning in trying to take the 
limitation off. We went to every session of the [Illinois] legislature for-well, 
ten years would be five sessions. I think we probably started in the late ‘50s.” 
Initially the legislature was not responsive: “The reaction was, until then it 
was keep it up. Keep the limit up. And the legislature was controlled-I 
shouldn’t say controlled, that’s too strong a word. The legislature was con- 
servative. And they had the insurance companies backing them. And many of 
the legislators were Republicans.” Finally in 1967, the Illinois Legislature 
eliminated the $30,000 cap in wrongful death cases. 
The combination of legislative and judicial changes would lead Nat 
Ozmon, ITLA president in 1969-70, to reminisce that “when we reached 
1969, the courtroom playing field for injury cases had been somewhat leveled” 
(ITLA 2002, 13). Corboy himself reflected on the period as follows: 
We were waiting, without knowing it. We took advantage of that 
which was there. But then when the judiciary started taking advantage 
of our-acceptance of our arguments, that’s when it really came in. 
And when lawyers became very successful in acquiring reasonable com- 
pensation for people and for particularly dead people who could no 
longer be required to be satisfied with $30,000 when a horse’s life was 
worth $90,000, when judges understood that and legislators understood 
it, the tort revolution really got [going].” 
to model these new instructions after the Bay Area Jury Instructions (BAJI), which was 
reportedly the first set of instructions of its kind in the nation. Corboy chaired the sub- 
committee that drafted the jury instructions on damages. The new damages instructions 
guided the jury to compensate the plaintiff for disability, disfigurement, pain and suffering, 
medical expenses, lost wages, and “permanency.” Only the permanency category would later 
he struck down by the courts. With this one exception, these instructions are still in use today. 
19. One of the arguments that Corboy made to the legislature was that he had won 
$90,000 in the case of wrongful death of a horse, hut a man’s life was worth only $30,000. 
284 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 
It is remarkable how little opposition there was to the reforms that 
permitted the expansion of the Illinois plaintiffs’ bar in the 1960s. The Illinois 
Supreme Court participated in a national movement to bolster access to the 
courts and to provide adequate compensation for injured persons, and even 
the Republican-dominated legislature eventually saw the need to make leg- 
islative changes in harmony with what was happening in the courts. The 
openings in personal injury law were consistent with other legal programs 
such as the national movement to provide access to  justice through legal aid 
reform, which began in the 1960s (see Johnson 1974). The tort revolution was 
not a matter of partisan politics, but rather of a social consensus consistent 
with the more activist state of the 1960s. In this climate, the larger political 
field was receptive to calls for better injury compensation by lawyers. 
With the sociopolitical tide in their favor, none of the trial lawyer groups 
at that point had felt the need to engage in partisan political activity. 
According to Corboy, that activity did not begin until late in the 1960s. In 
Corboy’s words, “there was no need.. . . there was no tort reform ma- 
chine.” The same was true at the national level. ATLA at that time did not 
have any particular political agenda (Burke 2002; Jacobson and White 2004). 
Until the late 1960s, the elite of the personal injury bar could celebrate both 
increased respectability and a relatively unchallenged prosperity. The emerg- 
ing elite within the personal injury bar focused mainly on issues of education 
and professional respectability. 
The changes in the law started to translate into larger verdicts for injured 
parties. In April 1965, a Cook County jury awarded the first million-dollar 
verdict to a single plaintiff in Illinois.20 While the plaintiffs’ bar crossed a 
significant threshold with this verdict, it was the only million-dollar verdict in 
Illinois in the 1960s. While Cook County juries had awarded only one million- 
dollar-plus verdict in the 1960s, they awarded nearly 30 million-dollar-plus 
verdicts during the 1970s. We can see the concrete meaning of this prosperity 
through Corboy’s personal story. In 1974, Corboy represented the estates of two 
men who were killed when the car they were riding in was rear-ended by an 18- 
wheel tractor-trailer. In September 1974, a Cook County jury awarded the 
plaintiff decedents a total of $1.7 million. I t  was Corboy’s first million-dollar- 
plus verdict. Corboy secured his second million-dollar-plus verdict just three 
years later (1977), when a Cook County jury awarded $1.6 million to a 
bricklayer who was injured from a fall when the scaffold he was standing on 
tipped over. Many other million-dollar verdicts were to follow. 
20. The case arose from an airplane crash in which 37 passengers and eight crew members 
were killed when a Boeing 720 airplane, operated by Northwest Orient Airlines, crashed in the 
Florida Everglades while en route to Chicago. The plaintiff, Terese Hollerich, filed the suit on 
behalf of her husband, John, who died in the crash. Both Boeing and Northwest were found 
liable, and the jury awarded the plaintiff $2 million. The plaintiffs’ attorney was John Kennelly, 
another local Irish Catholic lawyer, who served as ITLA president from 1968 to 1969. 
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V. NO-FAULT LIABILITY, TORT REFORM, AND THE 
POLITICIZATION OF THE PLAINTIFFS’ BAR 
The attack on the plaintiffs’ bar did not begin with corporate America. 
As litigation picked up for a number of reasons, attention began to focus 
more on the personal injury sector.2’ The major challenge began through 
the writings of two academics, Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O’Connell, who 
promoted no-fault automobile insurance as an efficient way to bring com- 
pensation to accident victims (see Burke 2002; Jacobson and White 2004, 
185-201). Liberal Democrats led by Michael Dukakis in Massachusetts, 
along with a few insurance companies, also lined up behind no-fault. The 
relatively liberal impetus for this activity underscores the fact that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers-despite their proximity in background to the Chicago Democratic 
Party-had operated by emphasizing professionalism, especially skill in lit- 
igation and bar service-and a consensus in favor of compensation for vic- 
tims. Their political connections remained quite local as well, and they had 
not invested much in the legal academy. They now confronted a group of 
policy and academic professionals who sought to take them out of the pic- 
ture at a time when personal injury lawyers depended largely on automobile 
accidents. Reflecting on this time, one local plaintiffs’ lawyer said that “no- 
fault would have ended the auto accident business and put all of the Irish 
and Jewish lawyers out of business.” 
In the late 1960s, no-fault legislation was introduced both at  the na- 
tional (Keeton-O’Connell Plan) and state level (Cotter Plan). Corboy and 
other leading Illinois plaintiffs’ lawyers lobbied and advocated against these 
proposals. But the Illinois plaintiffs’ bar was not yet set up to fight a battle of 
this scope. ITLA, for example, did not yet have its own lobbyist or even an 
executive director or office in the state capital. The plaintiffs’ bar also found 
that its public image was not helpful to their fight: “The average uninsured 
driver liked what our opponents were saying.. . . [W]e had little media 
support and were seriously out-financed by our opponents who had well- 
established public relations networks” (ITLA 2002, 15-16). 
Despite broad public support and well-financed backing from the in- 
surance industry, no-fault did not succeed in Illinois in the 1960s. Yet, for the 
plaintiffs’ bar, it was a harbinger of the fights ahead of them. They had begun 
to invest in politics, but politics at this time was far less intensive and ex- 
pensive than it would become. The situation intensified beginning in the late 
21. As early as 1963, some members of the judiciary called for the elimination of jury 
trials in civil cases in order to reduce court backlog. In response, ITLA and other bar groups 
presented alternative remedies to reduce backlog. In the context of this debate, a local 
newspaper editorial argued that an idle judiciary was to blame for the court delays. After the 
editorial was published, Corboy quickly came out in defense of the judiciary, arguing on local 
television that Illinois judges “were not loafing,” but were instead very busy handling signif- 
icant caseloads and attempting to resolve disputes not only through jury trials, hut also through 
settlement negotiations and dispositive motions. 
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1960s when the no-fault movement began to morph into the more all- 
encompassing tort reform movement. In 1969, ITLA held the “Trial and 
Tort Forum of 1969,” and Nat Ozmon, the president, assessed the emerging 
challenge: 
Today, as we hear from men who are experts in their fields and with that 
gift to be able to convey and teach to others, let us keep in mind that there 
is lurking within many circles, cloaked by various subterfuges, the indi- 
viduals or groups who have as their intent to steal from our clients, our 
litigants, the fault principals of tort law. (ITLA 2002, 15)22 
The opposition indeed took on steam in the 1970s with a second no-fault 
movement and other tort reform measures. In the early 1970s, the Illinois 
Legislature passed the Compensation of Automobile Accident Victims stat- 
ute, which, among other things, required the arbitration of automobile cases 
in smaller counties (200,000 or less) and in lower-value cases ($3,000 or less) 
in larger counties. The statute also limited plaintiffs’ recovery against owners 
of commercial vehicles, but not of private vehicles. With support from his 
peers, Leonard Ring, a leading Chicago plaintiffs’ lawyer and past president of 
ITLA (1966-68), challenged the constitutionality of the statute in Grace v. 
Howktt, 51 Ill. 2d 478 (1972). The court overturned the statute, declaring it 
unconstitutional. Around the same time, the federal secretary of Transpor- 
tation drafted a federal no-fault bill, and Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy 
got behind the bill and agreed to sponsor it. Tipped to the bill by Corboy’s 
childhood classmate and friend, Congressman Henry Hyde (R-Ill), Illinois’s 
elite plaintiffs’ lawyers called upon friends in D.C. to stop the bill. The 
plaintiffs’ bar succeeded in putting out this fire as well. 
In addition to the no-fault automobile insurance movement, the medical 
community also mobilized against the tort system in the 1970s. In 1976, the 
Illinois legislature passed the Medical Malpractice Reform Act, which, among 
other things, imposed a $500,000 cap on compensatory damages in medical 
malpractice disputes. Again, Leonard Ring and other leading Illinois plaintiffs’ 
lawyers used a litigation strategy to challenge the new legislation in Wright v. 
Central DuPuge Hospital Association (347 N.E. 2d 736 [Ill. 19761). The Illinois 
Supreme Court again sided with the plaintiffs, invalidating the statute as 
unconstitutional. 
The plaintiffs’ bar fought tort reform both in the courts and through 
more direct political strategies. The key change taking place during this time 
22. The hoofbeats of tort reform were heard not just in Illinois. Another speaker at the 
meeting, Richard Markus of Cleveland, and incoming president of ATLA, would echo 
Ozmon’s words, in speaking of the “clouds on the horizon.” Ozmon and Markus would be 
right. At the same time that they perfected their skills of persuasion in the courtroom and 
advanced into unforeseen markets, the plaintiffs’ bar would spend the next three decades 
fighting off tort reform. 
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was the increasing involvement of personal injury lawyers in Democratic 
politics. National Democratic politics had to a great extent fallen in line 
behind no-fault programs, and Illinois’s legislature at  one point had enacted 
no-fault as well. 
Economic sociologists hold that in order to become stable, actors in 
an emerging market (or profession) must often gain access to and rely upon 
“powerful outside actors.”*’ Just as corporate lawyers cannot be understood 
apart from the businesses who are the basic source of their social and eco- 
nomic power, no amount of investment in professionalism could undo the 
reliance of the plaintiffs’ bar on their ties to the Irish Catholic connections in 
the local Democratic Party. Corboy and other leading plaintiffs’ lawyers in 
Chicago were in a perfect position to reshape their professional strategy and 
activate their affinity with and connections to the local Democratic Party. 
Corboy was himself well positioned to invest more in politics, as he suggested 
quite clearly in his discussion of his relationship with the late Mayor Richard 
J. Daley: 
I was an admirer of Mr. Daley because he got things done. I was president 
of the Chicago Bar Association. Some issues came up concerning police 
involvement in the curtailment of crime. I asked to come over to the 
fifth floor [of City Hall] and discuss something Concerning police cases. I t  
had nothing to do with a specific case. And he invited me into his office 
and he confided in me. He talked with me like he had known me a long 
time. And I felt he trusted me. He knew I was of the same religion and 
same ethnic background as him. 
In the face of no-fault and other emerging tort reform movements, ac- 
cordingly, plaintiffs’ lawyers made a concerted effort to establish ties to state 
legislators. ITLA, which had historically been devoted to networking, ad- 
vancing the reputation of the profession, and knowledge sharing among trial 
lawyers, started to mobilize more forcefully as a political entity. In the early 
1970s, ITLA opened an office in Springfield, the Illinois state capital, and hired 
its first executive director, whose primary duties were to “lobby legislators and 
restructure ITLA’s operations” (ITLA 2002, 18).24 Also in the early 1970s, 
ITLA established the “HELP Trust” (Help Encourage Legislative Progress), 
which would later become the ITLA PAC (Political Action Committee). 
23.  Bourdieu expressed concern that the category of the “profession” actually conceals 
the ways that professions legitimate and obscure particular power arrangements in the state 
and the economy (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Bourdieu recommended studies of the field 
within which a profession operates in order to make those obscure hierarchies more visible 
(1998, 3 5 4 0 ) .  Stated in more pragmatic US. terms, Fligstein argues that “social relations 
within and across firms and their more formal relations to the state are pivotal to under- 
standing how stable markets emerge” (2001, 68). 
24. Likewise, ATLA moved its national headquarters from Boston to Washington, D.C., 
in 1977. 
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The elite plaintiffs’ lawyers in this way became major and sustained 
players in politics as a result of no-fault and its aftermath.25 They also became 
linked more directly to the Democratic Party. In the fight against no-fault, 
itself the product of academics and liberal politicians, some Republican de- 
fense lawyers also played important roles. John Bickley, ITLA’s president 
from 1971 to 1972, a Republican and a lawyer with a defense firm, recalled 
that “several Republicans, including myself and several others from major 
defense law firms, were induced to take a most active role in the defeat of the 
[no-fault] legislation [in Illinois]” (ITLA 2002, 20). Yet this plaintiff-defense 
alliance was short-lived.26 The plaintiffs’ bar ultimately invested not in a 
bipartisan professional strategy above politics but rather in the Democratic 
relationships that were already built into their careers and their personal 
histories. They sought to protect their clients and their practices increasingly 
through the Democratic Party at the local and national level. They shifted 
from a concentration on professional respectability to one that combined 
efforts to build professional status with intense political partisanship. 
The activation of their links to Democratic Party in the 1970s and 1980s 
is also evident in the way that Corboy recalled the beginning of his rela- 
tionship with Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan during this time: 
I met Michael Madigan about 20 years ago. I asked to meet him for the 
purpose of describing my views. I abruptly tell you because he has said 
this.. . . He did not know much about the antipathetic attitude of the 
Republican Party at the time. . . . And I educated him on the issues. And, 
ever since that time, I have been a fervent follower of Michael Madigan. 
Madigan, like Corboy, graduated from Loyola law school. Madigan is 
still Speaker of the Illinois House and his daughter, Lisa Madigan, is the 
Illinois attorney general-elected with Corboy’s support.27 The solidarity of 
the Democrats with the plaintiffs’ bar has made it possible to defeat-either 
through legislation or judicial action-every major tort reform measure in 
Illinois. 
Today, in fact, the very close ties to the Democratic Party are as much a 
part of the identity of the plaintiffs’ bar as their commitment to professional 
25. ITLA also instituted a sort of man-to-man defense strategy that John Mullen (ITLA 
president 1970-71) described as follows: “We had a lawyer working on and accountable for 
every Republican and Democrat legislator’s vote. We had commitments from at least a 
majority of House and Senate and then we were present whenever there was a committee or 
floor vote to make sure the commitment was carried out” (ITLA 2002, 19). 
26. Reminiscing on this collaborative period, Bickley lamented the loss of bipartisanship 
in ITLA: “Unfortunately.. .we have regained the reputation that our organization is one of 
the more consistent props to the Democratic leadership in the legislature. As a consequence, 
Republican hopefuls are again reluctant to openly participate with us, as it subjects them to 
attacks within their local party entities” (ITLA 2002, 21). 
27. Corboy’s own daughter, Joan Corboy, was a Cook County judge before her acci- 
dental death in 1999. 
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bar activity, trial craft, and the referral system that channels the largest cases 
to the elite of the subprofession. Corboy himself expresses unconditional 
devotion to the Democratic Party. “I’m a yellow dog Democrat. That’s what 
people from Texas call themselves. They’re Democrats because they believe 
the Democratic Party is the answer to government.” Another high-end 
plaintiffs’ lawyer talked about the practicalities of this allegiance: 
I make contributions to whoever is the Democratic horse we’re riding. 
That’s unfortunate because I grew up believing that anybody who votes 
a straight ticket is not a thinking person. But, you know, for somebody 
who does what I do for a living, and the number one, two, and three 
item on the Republican agenda is tort reform . . . 
In Corboy’s terms, ‘‘I contribute money and I raise money for whoever 
the candidate is. I consider it my responsibility. If I’m concerned about how 
government is run, I believe it’s my responsibility to become involved in the 
government. That’s my way of doing it.” With this widespread practice, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers are now among the nation’s largest group of contributors 
to the Democratic Party. Indeed, between 1994 and 1999, Chicago’s elite 
plaintiffs’ lawyers contributed an average of $21,000 each per year to state- 
based political campaigns and political action committees (Parikh 2001). 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers today do not have to reach out to establish contacts; 
they are sought after for their financial resources, for input on judicial can- 
didates, and the like. In the words of Corboy, “TWO senators called yesterday. 
One was from the State of Illinois. He was asking me my opinion of people 
who have been recommended for federal judgeships. There was another who 
wanted money from the State of Massachusetts.” Another elite plaintiffs’ 
lawyer noted, “I mean it’s relentless. Relentless. And, you know, people think 
that plaintiffs’ lawyers are just rolling in money. They call us every day. People 
running for Congress. People running for state rep. And nationally. Not just 
the president. You know, the attorney general in Iowa. The plaintiffs’ bar, we 
get hit a lot.” Professional responsibility within this subprofession, in short, 
now includes an obligation to give generously to the Democratic Party- 
which now embraces the plaintiffs’ bar as well. To make the obvious point 
seen in national politics today, there are very strong personal and policy di- 
visions now between the Republicans and the Democrats on the question of 
tort reform-an issue that energizes each side’s stock of major contributors. 
VI. INVESTING IN MAINSTREAM INSTITUTIONS 
While Dooley had limited his activities to the plaintiffs’ bar, Corboy 
became active in general bar associations as well, particularly the Chicago 
Bar Association. Corboy and others could see that they needed to gain 
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recognition in the general bar associations long dominated by the corporate 
bar.28 Corboy began to break down barriers in the legal profession in Illinois 
in the early 1970s. As we have noted, he was the first plaintiffs’ attorney to 
be elected president of the Chicago Bar Association (1972-73). Corboy was 
also the first plaintiffs’ lawyer to be named as chair of the ABA Section of 
Litigation (1979-80). These firsts were not only important for Corboy’s ca- 
reer, but they also set the course for future generations of Chicago plaintiffs’ 
lawyers. As Corboy noted, he “was the first plaintiffs’ lawyer to get elected [to 
the Chicago Bar Association]. Since then, we’ve had five people in this of- 
fice.” Active professional involvement is part of the culture of the high-end 
plaintiffs’ lawyer, and, in some firms, is even part of the job description. 
According to one elite plaintiffs’ lawyer in a competing firm: “Corboy set the 
pattern for showing that you have a responsibility to the whole legal pro- 
fession, not just the personal injury end of the profession. And that’s some- 
thing that I’ve taken very seriously. . . . Our firm has made it a requirement 
of every lawyer in this firm that we be active in various bar associations.” 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers had to work harder than their corporate counterparts to 
build their legitimacy. Corporate lawyers did not need the control of the bar 
associations to maintain their status and position. Plaintiffs’ lawyers felt that 
they needed the credibility and the power of the bar associations in order to 
hold their own in the profession. 
Corboy also followed the professional model of the corporate bar by 
building a philanthropic presence in the community. By the 1980s Corboy 
was already well known as a local philanthropist, with scholarship and fel- 
lowship programs at high schools and colleges across the city. Most of these 
scholarship programs are designed to help individuals get access to educa- 
tion-consistent with Corboy’s own background and commitment to young 
law clerks who have worked during school. Though his philanthropic focus is 
largely educational, his choice of where to contribute is highly personal and 
consistent with his position in the plaintiffs’ bar. The recipients of his 
scholarships include Loyola University, his law school alma mater, DePaul 
University Law School, where his son went to school, and Northwestern 
University Law School, where his daughter attended. He also has a scholarship 
program at John Marshall Law School for police officers who want to attend law 
school. Corboy established this scholarship because his father was a policeman, 
and he chose Marshall because police officers can attend law school there while 
they continue to work. Finally, Corboy is a significant contributor to the Big 
Shoulders Fund, which provides money for underprivileged Chicago youth to 
28. As Jacobson and White state, “Plaintiffs’ lawyers had long had a prickly relationship 
with the American Bar Association. Nonetheless, ATLA’s leaders in the 1960s urged 
members to join the ABA and become active in their state bars” (2004, 195). The success of 
the relationship helped to defeat a resolution before the House of Delegates in 1969 sup- 
porting no-fault. 
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go to private Catholic schools.29 An elite plaintiffs’ lawyer from a competing 
firm talks about Corboy’s legacy of philanthropy: 
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Corboy has been very generous with scholarships and with law school 
contributions.. . . And, you know, that certainly has had an influence 
on me.. . . I think that’s a very good precedent. I know that the people 
that work with Corboy, he makes it known to them that that’s 
something to be expected.. . .This profession has been very good to a 
lot of us. And you have to share that with other people. And I think 
Corboy has always felt that way too. 
This strategy furthers the ambition of personal injury lawyers for higher 
professional status and helps to build relationships with the schools that feed 
into the personal injury bar and the social worlds in which they interact. 
The elite of the plaintiffs’ bar continue to have a very strong interest in the 
well-being of a particular set of schools and institutions that provide ex- 
ternal support for its own power. 
VII. REPRODUCING THE PROFESSION 
Economic sociologists also note that markets (or professions) are 
internally hierarchical. Dominant actors seek to maintain their place in the 
hierarchy at the same time they work to advance the interests of the col- 
lective that sustains them. White (1981), for example, views markets as 
“self-reproducing social structures,” and highlights the importance that 
relationships play in both perpetuating the market as a whole and in 
maintaining the internal hierarchy of the market. Fligstein notes that 
“[flields contain collective actors who try to produce a system of domina- 
tion in that space. To do so requires the production of a local culture that 
defines social relationships between actors” (2001, 15). Similarly, the new 
institutionalism seeks to understand “how incumbents maintain their 
dominant positions.” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, 30). 
We have seen how the characteristics that Corboy embodies became 
central to the plaintiffs’ bar and its own internal hierarchy. Corboy and others 
of his generation succeeded in building the practice of personal injury law and 
generating larger verdicts and settlements. Threats to  that success have come 
from the outside through various tort reform movements. There is also 
a potential danger from within the legal profession or the particular 
29. Corboy recalled when Cardinal Joseph Bemardin of the Chicago Archdiocese 
approached him about contributing to the Big Shoulders Fund: “Cardinal Bemardin came 
into this office. This was in 1986,l believe.. . . He looked right at me. He had those clear blue 
northem Italian eyes. He said ‘I’d like you to contribute $1 million.’ And 1 said, ‘Well, how do 
you say no to a Cardinal?’ He looked right at me and said, ‘You don’t.’’’ 
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subprofession. Success may attract newcomers eager to share in the financial 
rewards generated by the more liberal environment but unwilling to  respect 
the rules developed by the pioneers. Conceivably, for example, lawyers with 
elite credentials from high-prestige law schools might have tried an elite 
strategy for gaining a share of this market, or perhaps advertisers might have 
sought to change the hierarchy in favor of those who simply could find cases. 
O n  the face of it neither possibility seems very plausible, but that is because 
we assume that elite lawyers gravitate naturally to corporate law and that mass 
advertisers will be ostracized. In both cases, however, an expanding market 
might have provided places for a few not only to build lucrative practices but 
also to mount a professional challenge that might affect the hierarchy of 
credentials and approaches valued in the subprofession. As it turned out, 
however, the plaintiffs’ bar in Illinois was able to grow and service the in- 
creased potential demand for their services without losing control or changing 
the rules that determine elite status. 
By the 1970s, Corboy already began growing the next generation of 
plaintiffs’ lawyers in Chicago. In his hiring practices and his mentoring 
philosophy, we can see just how Corboy reproduced a profession of lawyers 
much like himself and to the exclusion of others who do not fit the profile. In 
his words, “1 like people who have to work in order to get their education. 
And, if they’ve worked then they know how to juggle, they know how to 
study, and they know how to get things done. That’s how many of the people 
have worked out.” The late Jim Demos, a Corboy protPg6 who left to start 
his own firm and served as ITLA’s president in 1978-79, recalled Corboy’s 
mentoring style: “He doesn’t teach.. . . You absorb it through osmosis- 
excellence, hard work, and no shortcuts” (Elstrom 1989). When Corboy was 
asked how he spots a potentially successful young lawyer, he was quite explicit 
about finding and developing young lawyers in the Corboy model: “. . . 
the ones that act more like Corboy acts. The ones that have the same 
work ethic. The same ones who are just as inquisitive. . . those who are willing 
to give up much of their privacy and their personal life have a much bet- 
ter chance of success. Because that’s the way I’d done it.” Put another 
way, those with traditional elite credentials, often linked to advantaged 
family backgrounds, are welcome in large corporate firms, but not in the 
plaintiffs’ bar. The plaintiffs’ field seeks out those who prove themselves 
through hard work, come from a working-class background, and have a local 
law degree. 
In the early 1970s, Corboy hired two young lawyers who perfectly fit the 
Corboy profile, and who would excel under the Corboy system of “mentoring 
by osmosis.” In 1973, Corboy hired Thomas Demetrio, a recent graduate of 
the Illinois Institute of Technology’s Kent College of Law. Demetrio grew up 
in Evanston, Illinois, and his father owned a local restaurant. Demetrio was 
introduced to Corboy through a Cook County judge that Demetrio clerked 
for while in law school. Under Corboy’s tutelage, Demetrio quickly learned 
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the ropes of a plaintiffs’ practice, trying cases, networking with other law- 
yers, and getting involved in professional associations. Demetrio followed in 
Corboy’s footsteps in numerous ways. Demetrio became a leader in profes- 
sional associations, eventually becoming president of the Illinois Trial Law- 
yers Association (1988-89) and president of the Chicago Bar Association 
( 1993-94). He wrote numerous articles related to the profession, appearing in 
trade publications, law reviews, and as editorials in local  newspaper^.^' Break- 
ing with the long-standing tradition in which young plaintiffs’ lawyers left 
their mentors to start their own practice, Corboy made Demetrio a partner in 
the early 1980s. Though the firm now has roughly 20 lawyers, the firm still 
operates under the name Corboy and Demetrio. 
A year after Demetrio started with Corboy, Corboy hired Robert Clifford, 
a 1974 DePaul University Law School graduate. Like Demetrio, Clifford 
learned and benefited from Corboy’s trial expertise, his social contacts, and 
his professional involvement. Unlike Demetrio, Clifford left Corboy in 1984 
to start his own firm (Clifford Law Offices). In 1994, the two firms merged as 
Corboy, Demetrio and Clifford. The marriage was short-lived, however, 
lasting only a year. Clifford Law Offices reestablished its independence and 
today is one of the most successful plaintiffs’ firms in Chicago, if not the nation. 
Every year since 1994, Chicago Lawyer magazine has published its “Million- 
Dollar Settlement Survey,” which details the top settlements ($1 million or 
more) in Illinois and the plaintiffs’ firms who handled them. For example, the 
2002 settlement survey reports 219 settlements totaling $723 million (Chicago 
Lawyer 2002). Clifford Law Offices, also now with roughly 20 lawyers, topped 
the 2002 Million-Dollar Settlement Survey with 24 million-dollar-plus set- 
tlements totaling nearly $137 million. Like Corboy and Demetrio, Clifford has 
been nominated to the Inner Circle of Advocates and has been named nu- 
merous times among the best attorneys in the nation. Clifford served as pres- 
ident of the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association (1990-91), and is only the 
second plaintiffs’ lawyer (the first was Corboy) to serve as chair of the ABA 
Section of Litigation (2001-2). 
Demetrio and Clifford were not the only successful plaintiffs’ lawyers to 
get their start with Corboy. Dubbed by some as the “Philip Corboy University 
College of Law,” Corboy’s firm became the training ground for many of to- 
day’s most successful Chicago plaintiffs’ lawyers. A couple of quotations il- 
lustrate this phenomenon: 
We, in fact consider ourselves to be a third generation Corboy spin-off. 
There are probably now close to 35 firms in the city that have a direct 
or indirect connection to the Corboy law firm. 
30. Another example occurred in the late 1970s when Demetrio was appointed to the 
Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions, the same committee that 
Corboy served on earlier in his career. 
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What Phil Corboy has done over the years is that his firm has been a 
training ground.. . . Of course, Mr. Corboy does now have partners, 
and they have changed the whole structure. But, in the old days, you 
were expected to leave. People would leave and he would give them a 
bunch of cases. God bless him. He helped people. 
As we see in Corboy’s hiring and mentoring of Tom Demetrio, Bob 
Clifford, and others like him at the top of the plaintiffs’ bar, the senior parmers 
reproduce themselves in their hiring practices, often hiring workingclass 
young men like themselves who attended a local law school.31 This preference 
for hiring lawyers “like themselves” and hiring them from local law schools 
creates barriers to entry for young lawyers who do not fit these characteristics. 
The brand of professionalism embraced by the personal injury bar also 
highlights the modest personal characteristics (working-class background) of 
the successful plaintiffs’ lawyer rather than the prestige of his or her degrees. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers draw upon their modest beginnings in their public rhetoric 
and in their appeal to juries. According to one young plaintiffs’ lawyer, ‘So,  
the David and Goliath aspect of it. . . I’ve always been more of a pusher for the 
underdog.” Corboy, writing about his term as president of ITLA, said, “Our 
peers worked long and hard and have their time, money and energy to affect 
the tort evolution and its compensatory age. Our clients-the brain damaged, 
the legless and unsighted-are now being properly compensated” (ITLA 
2002, Stories of working-class men who now serve the underdog are 
ubiquitous in the rhetoric and self-concept of plaintiffs’ lawyers. This rhetoric, 
along with their personal histories, distinguishes plaintiffs’ lawyers from their 
corporate counterparts. It is part of their unique brand of professionalism. 
We can see the success of this strategy of reproduction by osmosis 
through the trajectories of the prot6gCs. During the late 1980s, Demetrio, 
Clifford, and other plaintiffs’ lawyers of the new generation began to move up 
in professional associations, and to take on the political activities of their 
mentors.” Demetrio served as president of ITLA from 1988 to 1989, and 
31. More than 90 percent of Chicago plaintiffs’ lawyers are men (Parikh 2001). 
32. This rhetoric is also seen at the national level. Senator John Edwards, the 2004 
Democratic candidate for vice president, embodies the plaintiff bar’s model of professionalism. 
His father worked in textile mills and his mother was a postal employee. He was the first per- 
son in his family to graduate from college, and he positions himself as a champion for “ordinary 
people.” 
33. This new generation mobilized against its own tort reform challenge in the 1990s. In 
1995, despite aggressive lobbying by the Illinois plaintiffs’ bar, the Illinois State Legislature 
passed a broad tort reform bill. With the help of ITLA, a handful of elite Illinois plaintiffs’ firms 
(including Corboy and Demetrio) got together and selected some of their own cases to chal- 
lenge the constitutionality of the bill. These cases were filed together and eventually made 
their way to the Illinois Supreme Court. ITLA instituted its first special assessment, raising 
nearly $1 million dollars from members to finance the case. With this funding, ITLA hired 
Laurence Tribe, a nationally renowned constitutional law professor from Harvard, to argue 
their case before the Illinois Supreme Court. In 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in the 
plaintiffs’ favor and struck down the legislature’s tort reform package as unconstitutional. 
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Clifford served two years later, from 1990 to 1991. Another elite plaintiffs’ 
lawyer of Clifford and Demetrio’s generation talked about this transition: 
I didn’t start moving up in the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association until 
probably the late 1980s, when I started getting much more involved. 
But, that was the same time Tom Demetrio did and Joe Power did and 
Bob Clifford did, because Corboy [and other elites of Corboy’s gener- 
ation] were ready to turn that over to us at that time. 
Another Corboy prot6gC who eventually left and established his own suc- 
cessful practice talked about Corboy’s influence in his professional activities, 
and how these professional activities served not only a political purpose, but 
also a business and professional purpose. 
When I joined him, Corboy was chair of the Section of Litigation of 
the ABA. Mr. Corboy was always active in bar work. It seemed like 
something you should do. . . .There are a number of reasons why it is 
important. It does help with business. I think it also helps you stay on 
top of what is going on in the legal community. 
The elite of the plaintiffs’ bar work together to pick appropriate people 
for particular professional offices. The above elite lawyer, who, at the time of 
the interview was running for office in a professional association, commented, 
You can run for any office you want, but there are good people ahead of 
me who I have respect for. I’m not going to try and jump the line. I 
hope nobody tries to jump the line on me. I should be uncontested here 
in Chicago.. . . If you have shown some leadership, hopefully you will 
scare people off. They will say “Gee. He has been an officer for four or 
five years. He has done a good job.” Then you won’t get contested. 
The professional culture of the plaintiffs’ bar continues to include pressures 
to support the profession, both in terms of involvement in professional 
activities and in contributing to their political activities. This pressure is 
most acutely felt at the top of the plaintiffs’ bar, where the relatively small 
group of elite lawyers watch each other. One elite member of the plaintiffs’ 
bar talked about their tort reform battle of the mid-1990s: “The frustrat- 
ing thing was the people who wouldn’t give anything [to fight tort reform], 
who’ve made tremendous money in this practice. If I told you their names, 
you’d be shocked. I t  was sad. But most people came through.” This gentle 
transition of power and the pressures to support the profession indicate the 
success of Corboy and those around him in building a subprofession that will 
survive succession. During the 1990s’ in fact, Corboy handed over the day-to- 
day running of his firm to Tom Demetrio and to his son, Philip Corboy, Jr., a 
296 LAW &a SOCIAL INQUIRY 
1978 DePaul Law School graduate who joined the firm in 1985 after starting 
his career at the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office. 
Perhaps most illustrative of how far the plaintiffs’ bar has come in just 
50 years is its prominence in the national scene. One example is how the 
plaintiffs’ bar quickly mobilized in response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 1 1, 2001. Shortly after the attacks, Congress pondered granting 
immunity to the airlines in order to protect the industry. In the process, 
Congress sought counsel from the plaintiffs’ bar, who argued on behalf of the 
September 11 Victim Compensation Fund in lieu of lawsuits against the air- 
lines. ATLA leaders called for a moratorium on lawsuits resulting from the 
attacks, and most plaintiffs’ lawyers demonstrated restraint. The ABA then 
created a Task Force on Terrorism and the Law that, among other things, 
reviewed and advised the government on the development and administra- 
tion of the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund. Corboy protCgC Robert 
Clifford, who was then chair of the ABA Section of Litigation, was asked to 
chair the terrorism task force. In addition, with support from ATLA, plain- 
tiffs’ lawyers established Trial Lawyers Care, a nonprofit program that pro- 
vides free legal services to victims’ families who are seeking compensation 
through the Victim Compensation Fund. Despite a rocky beginning, the fund 
was a success. The overwhelming majority of victims’ families (95 percent) 
filed for compensation through the fund, waiving their right to sue the airlines 
(Chen 2003). The mobilization and cooperation of the plaintiffs’ bar was 
critical to the voluntary moratorium on lawsuits and the success of the fund. 
The plaintiffs’ bar is sufficiently cohesive to hold in check those who might be 
tempted to  take advantage of the disaster to reap financial gain but jeopardize 
the hard-earned respectability of this subprofession. A more recent example 
of the rising prominence and influence of the plaintiffs’ bar was the selection 
of John Edwards as the 2004 Democratic vice presidential candidate. His 
skills as a trial lawyer, his appeal to “ordinary Americans,” and his fund- 
raising network were all deemed assets to the Democratic ticket. 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Markets and Status 
Consistent with the theoretical model of the “professionalism project,” 
the strategies that Corboy and his counterparts pursued during this period 
undoubtedly served to build markets and status for the personal injury bar. 
Their professional status now is much higher than it was in the early 1950s, 
reflected in part through the positions of power they have reached in such 
organizations as the American Bar Association. Robert Clifford’s central 
role with the ABA in the post-September 11 period, for example, illustrates 
how the ABA is willing to entrust vital professional issues to a leader of the 
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plaintiffs’ bar. From a market perspective, the plaintiffs’ bar has succeeded in 
building and protecting a market that allows its most successful practitioners 
to prosper beyond their wildest dreams. 
We also see how intertwined and mutually reinforcing these strategies are. 
The case referral system, for example, is most obviously a market strategy. It is a 
way to get business and control the market for the highest-stakes personal injury 
cases. At the same time, the referral system provides some distance from the 
market, thereby enhancing the professional status of those at the top. Similarly, 
political activities are certainly related to market protection and control, but 
they also enhance the status of the subprofession as leading plaintiffs’ lawyers 
assume important roles in Democratic politics more generally. 
Social Context of the Field 
The field perspective-and this relational biography of Corboy-shows 
the import of the capital possessed by Corboy and others, including the 
capital that came from their connections to the Irish Catholic Democratic 
machine in Chicago. Corboy and his counterparts lacked the kind of tradi- 
tional legal capital that provided access to the corporate bar and to economic 
power in Chicago. They also lacked the symbolic resources-lite degrees, 
professional bar leadership, and philanthropic service, for example-that 
provided legitimacy and credibility to the corporate bar. Yet their personal 
heritage gave plaintiffs’ lawyers access to resources and relationships that they 
otherwise lacked as outsiders to the corporate bar, including their ties from 
birth to the Chicago Democratic machine. The plaintiffs’ bar used the 
materials available to them to find strategies that would work in Chicago, and 
they constructed a subprofession, a supporting ideology, and a set of practices 
that made sense of what they had and what they were able to do. 
They first built a distance from claims processors and sought professional 
solidarity with trial attorneys committed to trial craft. They also worked the 
courts and the legislature to advance their market interests. Consistent with the 
social consensus in the more activist 1960s, the courts and legislature liberalized 
many of the laws pertaining to personal injury. The consensus evaporated first 
with the challenge of no-fault brought by liberal academics and then from a 
strong corporate attack in the name of tort reform. Shifting emphasis somewhat, 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers drew upon the social networks that were part of their 
heritage. Their working-class, ethnic, and religious backgrounds gave them ac- 
cess to the local political elite, and they drew on this political capital-the 
Chicago Democratic machine-as they struggled to protect their clients and 
themselves. As the tort reform movement took on steam, the plaintiffs’ bar re- 
sponded by developing a well-organized infrastructure for political mobilization. 
They also embraced the ideology of the underdog and the working class 
and rewarded those who followed in their footsteps. At the same time, they 
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continued to seek broader professional recognition by following the patterns of 
the corporate bar, including investing in mainstream bar association leader- 
ship, and investing in legal education and in philanthropy more generally.34 
David Wilkins’s study of black Chicago lawyers reveals striking parallels 
between the development of the plaintiffs’ bar in the second half of the 
20th century, and the evolution of the black bar in that same time period 
(forthcoming). For example, originally excluded from mainstream profes- 
sional associations that were dominated by the white Protestant corporate 
elite, both plaintiffs’ lawyers and black lawyers responded by establishing 
their own professional  association^.^^ Early on, both groups essentially op- 
erated in “parallel worlds” alongside mainstream professional associations 
that were dominated by the corporate elite. Eventually, both groups began to 
make headway into mainstream professional associations. Today, general bar 
associations are no longer the exclusive domains of the corporate elite. In- 
stead, many formerly excluded groups-including plaintiffs’ lawyers, black 
lawyers, and women lawyers-now play an active role in these associations 
and are represented in the leadership of these organizations. 
In both groups, we also see a heavy reliance on social networks, within a 
relatively small subgroup, for career building and for advancing the interests 
of the collective. As the plaintiffs’ bar relies heavily on referral networks for 
securing business, social networks among black Chicago lawyers are an im- 
portant source of business and career advancement. Further, as we see in 
Corboy’s story, the plaintiffs’ bar made its way in part by drawing upon its long 
standing social ties to the local Democratic machine. Likewise, Wilkins notes 
that the biggest transformation in Chicago politics between 1975 and 1995 was 
34. A natural question is whether our study of Chicago is representative of the way that this 
subprofession operates generally. There are of course similarities between Chicago and other 
jurisdictions. Daniels and Martin (2003) find that the “coming of age” of the Texas plaintiffs’ bar 
involved a similar attention to markets, politics, and professional ideology. Van Hoy (2003) also 
hnds Indiana trial lawyers working to improve their position and professional reputation over the 
second half of the 20th century. The variations are also quite notable, however. Indiana’s legis- 
lature has proven to be more receptive to tort reform, and Van Hoy notes that many of the Indiana 
personal injury lawyers are Republicans (2003). The Texas story is very similar to Chicago’s, but it 
appears that the group in Texas is considerably less homogeneous than in Chicago. In contrast to 
the central role that lawyer referral plays in an elite practice in Chicago, Kritzer notes that the 
leader of the plaintiffs’ personal injury bar in Wisconsin is also the most aggressive advertiser in the 
state (Kritzer forthcoming). It is also interesting that plaintiffs’ lawyers nationally have moved into 
new areas such as tobacco litigation (Mather 1998) and have drawn increasingly on class action 
suits. The Chicago plaintiffs’ bar has not moved into these potentially lucrative markets. The 
plaintiffs’ lawyers in different state settings who came together and sought to build status and 
professional success in the period after World War 11 had many things in common, but they also 
had to operate and build their subprofession in very different sociopolitical contexts. A close 
examination of structural histories akin to our Chicago story-and the links between the states- 
may help to explain why plaintiffs’ lawyers made different choices in building their markets and 
status in other states; why some elite personal injury lawyers have been able to stay on top; and why 
tort reform has been more successful in some states than in others. 
35. The National Bar Association, an association composed primarily of black lawyers, 
was established in 1925 and the Cook County Bar Association, a local bar association of black 
lawyers, was established in 1914. 
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a rise in black power, exemplified by the election of Mayor Harold Washington 
in 1983. Wilkins found that black lawyers in Chicago took advantage of 
their ties to this rising political power to further their individual careers and 
their collective advancement. While black power in Chicago declined after 
Washington’s death in 1987, blacks still represent a significant power base in 
Chicago and black lawyers are intimately linked to this local black power base. 
Consistent with other studies that focus on emerging markets (or professions) 
within the context of a field, the history of the plaintiffs’ bar, like the history of 
the black bar, is a story about the central role that social networks and local 
political power play in the making of a subprofession. 
Of course, plaintiffs’ lawyers and black lawyers are not the only groups 
with access to powerful outside actors. As suggested earlier, the corporate bar 
has advanced its position in part through its social connections to powerful 
corporate interests. As the defining characteristics of the personal injury bar 
and their ties to the local political elite emerged from their underprivileged 
social background, the defining characteristics of the elite corporate bar 
emerged from their relatively privileged social background and their ties to 
the economic power elite. 
Internal Hierarchy 
The story of Corboy’s career also shows how the subprofession and the 
rules that define it came to reinforce a particular professional hierarchy. 
Corboy and his counterparts constructed a subprofession that promotes the 
leadership position of elite plaintiffs’ lawyers, secures the best cases for that 
elite through an explicit and well-understood hierarchy and referral system, 
and ensures political protection for their markets and clients. The elite and 
the rank and file of the personal injury bar buy into the hierarchy and the 
characteristics that make it up-professional bar leadership, courtroom 
success, commitment to Democratic politics, and a distance from the am- 
bulance chasing and undignified advertising of those who occupy lower 
positions in the subprofession’s hierarchy. Elite status is reserved to those 
who pay their dues, come through the prevailing elite, and invest in the 
values and defer to the ideology of the subprofession. It is almost impossible 
to reach the elite of the Chicago plaintiffs’ bar without following and 
reinforcing the model developed by Corboy and a few others, and indeed 
learning it through close enough contact to allow osmosis. 
Unique Professional Ideology 
The focus on the field also lends insight into the unique professional 
ideology of the plaintiffs’ bar. Their working-class backgrounds not only pro- 
vided them with a particular set of social relationships; they also became 
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the basis for a distinctive professional ideology that reinforces their practice. 
We can see the ideology by comparing the story of the plaintiffs’ bar with 
that of corporate law firms. The history of Skadden Arps, for example, shows 
the relative success of Skadden Arps in hiring increasingly from the most 
prestigious law schools (Caplan 1994). In doing so, they became more com- 
petitive in the labor market, and their associates with elite law school cre- 
dentials served in building markets and status in the corporate bar. Chicago 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, by contrast, recruit almost exclusively from local law 
schools. Similar recruiting is found in other locales (see, e.g., Kritzer forth- 
coming). Despite a powerful desire for status in the mainstream legal pro- 
fession, these plaintiffs’ lawyers have not sought to draw on the credentials 
and powerful professional networks that come from elite law schools. In 
fact, the plaintiffs’ bar thrives in part because it has managed to resist some 
of the hierarchies embedded more generally in the profession. The plaintiffs’ 
bar has made a virtue out of its own relative marginality. Rather than deny 
their working-class heritage and lack of connection to the elite law schools, 
they celebrate their differences. In doing so, they position themselves as 
uniquely qualified to serve their “disadvantaged” clients, creating both a 
market niche and a professional niche that at once defines and protects 
their place in the system. The alignment with the Democratic Party (the 
party of “ordinary people”) reinforces their identity as underdogs fighting on 
behalf of those who cannot help themselves. 
The personal injury bar is not the only subsector of the legal profession 
that mirrors the social background of its clients. Traditional criminal defense 
lawyers, for example, also, like their clients, come from more modest back- 
grounds. Yet, as Kenneth Mann has shown, defense lawyers that specialize in 
white-collar crime tend to work for elite corporate firms and come from higher- 
status groups-again consistent with the social background of their clients 
( 1985).36 As Heinz and Laumann (1982) have observed, the American legal 
profession is an “over-determined social system.” The stratification in the legal 
profession originates in, and is deeply rooted in, the larger society. 
While the unique professional ideology of the plaintiffs’ bar solidifies and 
protects their market niche, the focus of Chicago plaintiffs’ lawyers on local 
law schools, working-class backgrounds, and local philanthropy perpetuates 
the relatively lower status of the plaintiffs’ bar and reinforces the dominant 
position of the corporate bar. Since the legal profession in the United States 
tends to place corporate lawyers at  the top of the hierarchy, they do not as a 
rule have to work as hard for professional credibility as the lawyers in the 
plaintiffs’ bar. Of course, some corporate lawyers invest in bar activities, 
philanthropy, scholarship, pro bono work, and other legitimating activities. 
But the ethic of the plaintiffs’ bar-at least in Chicagerequires virtually 
all members of the elite to engage in all these activities. And yet, despite 
36. We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this important observation. 
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increasing numbers of bar presidents and ever more impressive philanthropy, 
the plaintiffs’ bar cannot come close to matching the prestige of the corporate 
bar-which, after all, defined the rules. Since the status hierarchies continue 
to be tilted strongly toward the corporate bar, the plaintiffs’ bar will remain 
somewhat suspect no matter how professionally pure their behavior is or how 
impure is that of their corporate counterparts. Indeed, while the plaintiffs’ bar 
ranks fourth of 42 legal fields in mean income, it ranks only 32nd of 42 fields in 
terms of professional prestige (Heinz, Nelson, et al. forthcoming). Further, 
the tort reform movement continues to  gain ground in many settings, and the 
plaintiffs’ bar must continually defend its activities and its profession. To 
some extent, then, we could say that the “professionalism project” of the 
plaintiffs’ bar has succeeded only by degrees. While the plaintiffs’ bar has 
developed an established subprofession and stable market niche, its legiti- 
macy within the legal profession and even society at  large remains suspect. 
Just as the particular characteristics of this subprofession are not inevi- 
table, the continued strength of the plaintiffs’ bar is not g ~ a r a n t e e d . ~ ~  One
way to challenge this dominance would be to seek to  change the rules to give 
value to different forms of capital-the ability to serve more people quickly 
rather than excel in litigation, for example, or the ability to challenge 
practices of major corporations through class actions and complex negotiated 
settlements. There is some evidence of these kinds of challenges, but they 
have not yet made headway in Chicago. There could also be external chal- 
lenges that change the value of the capital in the field. Suppose, for example, 
that the corporate bar expanded so rapidly that it was able to dry up the source 
of talent for the plaintiffs’ bar in local law schools, leading to a change in the 
profile of the local law schools as they reorient themselves to a new constit- 
uency. O r  the Democratic Party could decide that the plaintiffs’ bar is a lia- 
bility, perhaps in response to some controversy or if tort reform became so 
successful that it reduced the ability of plaintiffs’ lawyers to support the party. 
Such events could change the dynamics of the field and even the rules for 
what and who is valued. These are speculations, of course, but the general 
point is that an analysis based on the field can illustrate both the staying power 
and the fragility of a particular hierarchy built with a particular market- 
supported by an attendant ideology and brand of professionalism. 
Nevertheless, this analysis shows that the plaintiffs’ bar in Chicago is 
especially remarkable for its ability to  construct and preserve a unique pro- 
fessional identity, limit entry into the profession, and channel investment 
into the institutions that serve the subprofession and its hierarchy. Corboy’s 
long-standing tenure as “dean” of the Chicago personal injury bar is a cause 
37. A reviewer noted that the personal injury bar shares many characteristics with medieval 
guilds (including local orientation, selective admissions, apprenticeship, strong associations with 
outside power, a commitment to their craft, and a referral-based husiness) (see Krause 1996). Like 
today’s personal injury bar, the guilds once enjoyed monopoly power over their local markets. 
Their heyday, of course, has passed. 
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and result of that success. While consistent with the work on the ways that 
professions may protect markets and status, attention more generally to the 
sociopolitical context of the field shows how the “selection” of strategies 
depended on the resources and capital that certain actors, including Corboy, 
could mobilize, invest, and institutionalize at a certain historical juncture, 
and it shows how and why their success led to embedding the personal injury 
bar in a complex world of working-class ideology, trial craft, professional bar 
leadership, Democratic politics, local philanthropy, and a market referral 
system that favors the established elite of the plaintiffs’ bar. 
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